The theme of the lecture is the question why World War II still casts such dark shadows over East Asia, whereas in Europe the problem with Germany seems to have been resolved.

The reasons for revived nationalism in Japan, and revisionism on the war, as well as for anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, and renewed anti-Japanese animus in South Korea, are largely to do with domestic politics. In China, overt anti-Japanese demonstrations only began in the 1980s when China opened its doors to foreign, especially Japanese investment. 'Patriotic education' became a substitute for the largely discredited Communist ideology, and a necessary justification for the continuing monopoly of the Communist Party.

In Japan, the historical debate on the emperor's role, on the Nanking Massacre, on Yasukuni shrine, etcetera is also a substitute for something else, namely the long neglected debate on Japan's postwar constitution, which outlaws the use of military force. Instead of debating a revision of the constitution, Left and Right have debated Japan's role in the war.

The Korean debate on Japan is not so much directly about Japan as about the collaboration of Koreans with the Japanese rulers. This, too, is a substitute for a larger political issue. The former collaborators are associated with the conservative elite that ruled S. Korea under the military governments and continued to dominate the conservative party.

Current tensions in East Asia are not just coloured by memories of the war, however. Just as important are Japan's confused relations with its neighbours since the mid-19th century. In the 1860s Japan associated itself with the West in opposition to 'backward' Asia. Later it tried to 'Japanize' Asia by force, inspired by a pan-Asianist ideology. For some members of the Chinese and Korean elites, Japan was a model of Asian modernization. To others, Japan was a mortal enemy. Echoes of this can still be heard.

Ironically, Chinese and Korean nationalism owe a lot to modern Japanese nationalism, which, in turn, borrowed much from German nationalism. This is particularly true of ethnic nationalism, the propaganda of national essence and uniqueness, that still fuels authoritarian politics and mutual hostility in East Asia.

In conclusion, the politics of memory are about much more than history; they reflect unresolved political problems peculiar to each country. The speaker argues that these will have to be solved first. Only then will the memories cease to poison relations between countries that have nothing to gain from mutual hostility and a great deal to lose.